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Peano numerals as buck-stoppers
In this abstract certain views of Ackerman (1978) and Kripke (1992) will
be examined. First, they claim that not any arithmetical terms is eligible for
universal instantiation and existential generalisation in doxastic or epistemic
contexts. Second, they claim that Peano numerals are eligible for universal
instantiation and existential generalisation in doxastic or epistemic contexts.
Third, they claim that the successor relation and the smaller-than must be
effectively calculable. These three claims will be examined from the framework
of modal-epistemic arithmetic, i.e. arithmetic extended with certain modal,
epistemic and modal-epistemic principles. I will present theorems that give
support to the second and the third claim of Ackerman and Kripke.
Let LPA denote the language of Peano Arithmetic (PA). Suppose one adds
a knowledge operator K and a possibility operator ♦ to that language, yielding
the language of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (LMEA). Then one question is
whether Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA) should contain the unrestricted
principle of universal instantiation and its equivalent, the unrestricted principle
of existential generalisation.
UIt ∀xφ→ φ (t/x) for any t, φ ∈ LMEA.
EGt φ (t/x)→ ∃xφ for any t, φ ∈ LMEA.
Ackerman (1978) and Kripke (1992) argue that the answer should be negative.
(Kripke’s answer was given in unpublished lectures. Steiner (2011) gives the
first summary and discussion of Kripke’s work on this subject in print.) To be
more precise, Ackerman and Kripke rejected EGt when the knowledge opera-
tor is replaced by a belief operator. Moreover, Ackerman’s counterexample in-
volved an arithmetical description term, which does not belong to LPA. Finally,
Ackerman talks about Arabic numerals, Roman numerals and other numerals,
whereas Kripke focuses on the decimal numerals. Setting aside these differences
in this abstract, I will now present an Ackerman-Kripke style counterexample
to EGt. Note that the following is an instantiation of EGt:
Kt = t→ ∃xKx = t. (1)
Consider the following terms t and t′: 523776 and 2× (5 + 27)× (8× 1023),
with n the Peano numeral for the natural number n. It is a mathematical truth
that
523776 = 2× (5 + 27)× (8× 1023) .
Moreover, it is perfectly possible that the following is true about someone, call
her Anne:
K2× (5 + 27)× (8× 1023) = 2× (5 + 27)× (8× 1023) . (2)
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But it may perfectly be the case that the following is not true about Anne:
∃xKx = 2× (5 + 27)× (8× 1023) . (3)
In order to find out whether two terms are co-denoting or to find out which
number is denoted by a complex term, one needs to carry out computations.
Certainly, it is possible to do so. But as long as one has not done so, one does
not know. So, it would seem there is a counterexample to (1) and, therefore,
EGt. Contrast the above with the situation in which the following is true about
Anne
K523776 = 523776 (4)
There does not seem to be a case in which it is false about Anne that (3). In
Kripke’s terminology, 523776 is a buck-stopper, whereas 2× (5 + 27)× (8× 1023)
is not. If Peano numerals are indeed buck-stoppers, then one accepts univer-
sal instantiation and existential generalisation restricted to Peano numerals, i.e.
the constant 0 and s (t′) for any Peano numeral t′.
UIn ∀xφ→ φ (t/x) for any Peano numeral t and for any φ ∈ LMEA.
EGn φ (t/x)→ ∃xφ for any Peano numeral t and for any φ ∈ LMEA.
An obvious follow-up question is what could justify the epistemic difference be-
tween Peano numerals on the one hand and other complex arithmetical terms on
the other hand. Ackerman thinks that the Peano numerals reveal the structure
of the natural numbers.
But what is special about what is expressed by numerals as compared with
other standard names? I cannot answer this precisely, but, imprecisely,
there seems to be a sense in which a numeral directly specifies the position
of its referent in the progression of numbers. Of course, a standard name
that is a mathematical description such as ‘the smallest perfect number’
also specifies (in the sense of expressing information that logically deter-
mines) the position of its referent. But the position of what a numeral
refers to can be known directly simply by understanding the numeral,
without having any mathematical knowledge beyond what is necessary to
understand the numeral. I do not mean to suggest that one can under-
stand ‘75’ without having the concepts of any other numbers. ‘75’ can
be understood only in the context of a system of numbers, and knowing
and understanding a system of numerals seems to be a matter of knowing
how to generate in order the progression of numerals and knowing how to
count transitively (e.g. to count marbles) in accord with the progression.
(Ackerman, 1978, p. 151)
Saul Kripke also thought that the structure of the decimal numbers is repre-
sented in an epistemically transparent way by the decimal numerals, whereas
in general this is not the case for more complex descriptions of the decimal
numbers (Steiner, 2011, p. 161-166). In contrast to Ackerman, he thought that
the Roman numerals denote different numbers than the numbers denoted by
the decimal numerals (Steiner, 2011, p. 165). Similarly, the decimal numer-
als denote different numbers than the numbers denoted by Peano numerals,
because the first ten decimal numerals refer to cardinal numbers rather than
ordinal numbers (Steiner, 2011, p. 161-163). Kripke is aware of the problem
that, when one considers very big natural numbers, representations other than
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the Peano numeral for that number may be more revealing (Steiner, 2011, p.
165, 175-176). This problem will be set aside as well.
Finally, Kripke stresses the importance of the effective calculability of the
‘successor of’ and ‘smaller than’ relations (Steiner, 2011, p. 163, 166). This
ties in well with Ackerman’s comments on the importance of ‘knowing how to
generate in order the progression of numerals’.
The main goal of my paper is to give support for the second and the third
claim made by Ackerman and Kripke. For this purpose I will make use of a
weak version of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic, which I call MEA−. Next to PA,
EA− contains two restricted versions of universal instantiation and, therefore,
also restricted versions of the principle of existential generalisation.
UI ∀xφ→ φ (y/x) for all φ ∈ LEA.
RUIt ∀xφ→ φ (t/x) for all t, φ ∈ LPA.
Principle UI expresses a conceptual link between quantifiers and variables. Prin-
ciple RUIt is crucial for the full deductive power of PA. Furthermore, EA−
also contains the rule of universal generalisation. In addition, EA− contains
the law of self-identity and the principle of the substitutivity of identicals (both
restricted to variables). The theory also contains modal system S5. Finally,
EA− contains the following epistemic and modal-epistemic principles.
ME1 Kφ→ φ.
ME2 `MEA− φ ⇒ `MEA− ♦Kφ.
ME3 `MEA− φ→ ψ ⇒ `MEA− Kφ→ ♦Kψ.
A first philosophically interesting result is that UIn and EGn are theorems
of EA−.
Lemma 1. `EA− ∀x (x = 0→ (φ↔ φ (0/x))) for all φ ∈ LMEA
Proof. The proof is by the induction principle.
First, one needs to prove that
0 = 0→ (φ′ ↔ φ′ (0/0)) ,
with φ′ = φ (0/0). But this is trivial, since φ′ (0/0) is identical to φ′.
Second, one needs to prove that
∀x ((x = 0→ (φ↔ φ (0/x)))→ (s (x) = 0→ (φ′ ↔ φ′ (0/s (x))))) ,
with φ′ identical to φ (s (x) /x). But this is trivial again, since it is an axiom of
PA that ∀xs (x) 6= 0.
Lemma 2. `EA− ∀x∀y (x = s (y)→ (φ↔ φ (s (y) /x))) for all φ ∈ LMEA (as-
suming that s (y) is substitutable for x in φ).
Proof. The proof is by the induction principle.
First, one needs to prove that
∀y (0 = s (y)→ (φ′ ↔ φ′ (s (y) /0))) ,
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with φ′ = φ (0/0). This is trivial, since it is a theorem of PA that 0 6= s (y).
Second, one needs to prove that ∀x, if
∀y (x = s (y)→ (φ↔ φ (s (y) /x))) ,
then
∀y (s (x) = s (y)→ (φ′ ↔ φ′ (s (y) /s (x)))) ,
with φ′ identical to φ (s (x) /x). Suppose that s (x) = s (y). It follows by an
axiom scheme of PA that x = y. Suppose that φ (s (x) /x). It follows by the
substitutivity of identicals that φ (s (y) /x). And vice versa.
Theorem 3. `EA− ∀xφ → φ (t/x) for every φ ∈ LMEA and for every Peano
numeral t.
Theorem 3 gives support to the proposition that Peano numerals are buck-
stoppers. Futhermore, inspection of the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 makes it clear
that the recursive axioms for the successor function and the induction principle
are the driving force behind the results. The Peano numerals can be used for
universal instantiation, since they are directly linked to the inductive structure
of the natural numbers. By the way, no epistemic or modal-epistemic principle
is used in the proofs. Therefore, K could also be read as a doxastic operator.
The fact that Peano numerals are buck-stoppers does not explain yet why
the other arithmetical terms are not buck-stoppers. It is my conjecture that
one can prove that there is an interpretation M of LMEA such that M |= (2)
and M 6|= (3). At this moment I do not have a proof yet. (It is a complicated
business to build models for LMEA, cf. (Heylen, 2013)).
A second philosophically interesting result is that the successor relation and
the smaller-than relation are indeed epistemically transparent. First one needs
to prove that all arithmetical terms are eligible for universal instantiation in
certain contexts.
Definition 4. Let τ be a fragment of LMEA defined as follows:
1. if φ is an atomic formula, then φ ∈ τ ;
2. if φ is ¬ψ and ψ ∈ τ , then φ ∈ τ ;
3. if φ is ψ → θ and ψ, θ ∈ τ , then φ ∈ τ ;
4. if φ = ∀xψ and ψ ∈ τ , then φ ∈ τ ;
5. if φ = ♦Kψ and ψ ∈ τ , then φ ∈ τ ;
6. nothing else is an element of τ .
The second main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 5. `MEA− ∀xφ→ φ (t/x) for any t ∈ LMEA and φ ∈ τ .
In contrast to the proof of Theorem 3, epistemic and modal-epistemic prin-
ciples are used in the proof of Theorem 5.
Next are the two desired theorems.
Theorem 6. `MEA− t = s (t′)→ ♦Kt = s (t′) for all t, t′ ∈ LMEA.
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Theorem 7. `MEA− t < t′ → ♦Kt < t′ for all t, t′ ∈ LMEA.
To sum up, Theorem 3 gives support to the Ackerman-Kripke claim that
Peano numerals are buck-stoppers and Theorems 6 and 7 give support to their
claim that the successor-relation and the smaller-than relation need to be effec-
tively calculable. The proof of Theorem 3 ties in nicely with the justification
given by Ackerman and Kripke for their second claim.
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